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{AU: Please supply an abstract of 100–150 words, 3–5 keywords, and a brief 
contributor’s note.} 
The South Atlantic Quarterly * Against the Day * July 2019 
Schwarz and Stierl * Amplifying Migrant Voices and Struggles at Sea as a Radical 
Practice’ 
Nina Violetta Schwarz and Maurice Stierl {AUS: I have removed the note number for 
your acknowledgments but have retained the text as an unnumbered note.} 
Amplifying Migrant Voices and Struggles at Sea as a Radical 
Practice 
{AU: Since not all readers will be familiar with Alarm Phone, please provide a brief 
explanation of the project that will set the stage for the quotation that follows.} 
On Tuesday, the 24th of July 2018, the Alarm Phone was alerted to 20 boats in 
distress in the Western Mediterranean Sea. 10 boats were rescued to Spain, 8 were 
returned to Morocco. For two boats we have no further information. (Alarm Phone 
2018a) 
In some sense, the events at sea on July 24, 2018 were both unique and exemplary. The 
twenty boats that the WatchTheMed Alarm Phone sought to assist carried different numbers 
of people, with each person having a variety of reasons for making an “individual motion . . . 
of desertion” and seeking to cross the sea (Mezzadra 2004: 270). At the same time, that 
hundreds of people reached Spain that day highlights also political and migratory dynamics 
in this region more generally. Though, in the ten years prior, the western Mediterranean 
migration route connecting Morocco and Spain had been the least frequented in relation to 
other major areas of crossing, over 2018 it became the busiest maritime route for illegalized 
migrants seeking to reach EUrope.1 While migrant movements declined significantly along 
the central Mediterranean route and remained at the relatively low level of the year prior in 
the Aegean Sea, the intensity of Moroccan-Spanish border transgressions can be described as 
nothing short of a “Western Mediterranean summer of migration.” {AU: Is this a quote from 
a source? If so, please cite. If not, please remove quotation marks and lowercase 
2 
“western.”} Over the summer of 2018, the phones of Alarm Phone members were constantly 
receiving and transmitting information about ongoing distress situations at sea. Between the 
beginning of June and the end of August alone, the activists rendered assistance to about 360 
boats seeking to cross the sea between Morocco and Spain. 
This article takes the encounters between migrant travelers at sea and Alarm Phone 
activists on land as a starting point to inquire into recent transformations in maritime migrant 
mobilities and EUropean and North African attempts to govern them, with a focus on the 
western Mediterranean Sea. As a transborder network that is involved in everyday struggles 
over movement in all three Mediterranean regions, tracing Alarm Phone’s interventions can 
provide insights into the complex interplay between enactments of the freedom of movement 
and the ways in which EUrope seeks to preempt and deter them. We suggest that the Alarm 
Phone’s radical practice of “flight help” is situated right at the nexus of movement conceived 
in a kinetic and a political sense (Mitropoulos and Neilson 2006). 
Listening to Those at Sea as an Analytic of the Border Regime 
On October 11, 2018, Alarm Phone turned four years old. It was the fifth anniversary of a 
shipwreck off the coast of Libya that had cost the lives of at least two hundred people—an 
accident that could have been prevented had the Italian and Maltese authorities reacted 
quickly to the satellite phone calls from the migrant boat involved (WatchTheMed 2013). 
Over the years, Alarm Phone activists have listened to hundreds of voices of people in severe 
emergency situations—voices expressing torment, desperation, anxiety, panic, anger, 
courage, and persistence. Sometimes, they enunciated an exhausted jubilation—a rescue asset 
was detected, a shore in sight, a boat landing successful. At other times, these voices fell 
silent—connections suddenly breaking down, phones losing battery or reception, phones 
falling overboard or being thrown into the sea. By listening to these voices and amplifying 
their political demands, the Alarm Phone has directly engaged in these struggles over 
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movement and arrival and has intervened irrespective of knowing the names or identities of 
those on the other end of the line. Occasional calls turned into frequent calls, dozens of boats 
turned into hundreds, then thousands. 
Launched at the moment when the end of the Italian military-humanitarian operation 
Mare Nostrum left a lethal rescue gap, the Alarm Phone has since turned into a transborder 
and multilingual collective composed of about 130 activists situated in more than a dozen 
countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. Having entered the maritime border zone at this 
critical moment in time, albeit merely through a phone, the activists have become witnesses 
at sea, and part of the “nongovernmental turn” in the Mediterranean, with first Migrant 
Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) and later Sea-Watch, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), and 
several other NGOs sending Search and Rescue (SAR) assets to the area off the coast of 
Libya. While the presence of nongovernmental rescue assets has fluctuated in light of 
increasingly vicious criminalization campaigns, the Alarm Phone has continuously received 
calls from those set on reaching EUrope via the sea. 
So far, the “phone activists” have aided in over 2,400 distress situations—1,615 in the 
Aegean Sea, 600 in the western Mediterranean, and 222 in the central Mediterranean (Alarm 
Phone 2018b). In the process, they have witnessed varying migratory trajectories and patterns 
in the context of an evolving politics of control in the Mediterranean. Having watched the sea 
and listened to people on the move for over four years, the Alarm Phone can be viewed as an 
analytic of power (Foucault 1998: 90), or, rather, as an analytic of the EUropean border 
regime (Stierl, 2019), able to observe the interplay between disobedient movements and their 
policing—from the mass arrivals via the Aegean Sea in 2015 to their rapid decline after the 
EU-Turkey deal in spring 2016, from the mass dying in the central Mediterranean peaking in 
2016 to the installation of Libyan forces able to violently reduce crossings in 2017 and 2018, 
from the relatively few instances of sea migration to Spain in 2014 to their explosion in 2018. 
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The activists understand the Alarm Phone as an effective infrastructure of support to 
migrants’ precarious mobilities, indeed as a segment of an existing “migratory underground 
railroad.” {AU: Does this description come from a specific source? If so, please cite.} 
Self-Organized Crossings via Morocco 
The western Mediterranean is not a new migratory route but has evolved and shifted over 
several decades. From the 1990s onward, in light of increasing movements to Spain via the 
Strait of Gibraltar, Spanish-Moroccan collaborations in border enforcement intensified but 
were able only temporarily to reduce crossings. In the mid-2000s, arrivals increased on the 
Canary Islands via the Atlantic route, peaking in 2006. This prompted the launch of the first 
large-scale operation of the European border agency Frontex, which turned Morocco’s coast 
into an early laboratory of EU border enforcement with significance for subsequent forms of 
maritime migration governance. Keen to preempt movements to the Spanish archipelago, 
Frontex intervened through operation HERA alongside Spanish patrols within West African 
waters, and thereby externalized the EUropean border. At the same time, incentives were 
offered to governments in places of departure to intercept outward migration movements, as a 
result of which “a hunt was on for the illegal migrant across the deserts, forests, and towns 
stretching beyond the Euro-African border” (Andersson 2014a: 123). These measures, in 
addition to bilateral repatriation agreements between Spain and West African countries, 
prompted a decrease in crossings, and by 2009, the western Mediterranean route had 
practically been sealed off. While the reopening of the Mediterranean frontier in the wake of 
the 2011 Arab uprisings led to large-scale crossings along the central and eastern 
Mediterranean routes, those to Spain remained comparably low. 
This changed, however, when arrivals nearly tripled in 2017 from the year prior and 
even more remarkably in 2018, when Spain overtook Italy as well as Greece as the front-
runner in terms of migrant arrivals via the Mediterranean. While this shift was clearly also a 
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consequence of the increasingly repressive migrant containment practices in Turkey and 
Libya, the crossing of over fifty-five thousand people within a year speaks to a migratory 
dynamism not witnessed for over a decade in the western region. Though the majority of 
travelers can be thought of as “transit migrants,” having come mainly from West and Central 
Africa, more than one quarter were estimated to be so-called harragas (meaning “those who 
burn” borders and identity documents), Northern Africans—particularly young Moroccans 
and Algerians—who took to the boats. Some factors that have contributed to the rise in 
harraga movements include the worsening economic situation that has increased the rate of 
youth unemployment over recent years, as well as the increasingly discriminatory and 
repressive practices by the Moroccan regime against certain segments of the Moroccan 
population. In particular, those involved in ongoing political and social protests in the 
northern Rif region have suffered through a wave of arbitrary arrests, prompting many who 
could to escape via the sea. The death of the Moroccan student Hayat B., shot at sea in 
September 2018 by the Moroccan Navy, has caused renewed protests as well as repression of 
harraga migration in the kingdom. 
Ever since Alarm Phone was launched, ties between activists and people on the move 
in Morocco, especially those from West and Central Africa, have been close and have 
intensified subsequently through the creation of Alarm Phone networks within Morocco. 
Such collaboration has allowed the activists to assist thousands of people at sea in this region, 
which has in turn provided them with further insights into the modalities of western 
Mediterranean crossings. The case of the western route is significant, however, not only due 
to the increasing number of arrivals. In contrast especially to boat migration from Libya, the 
crossings from Morocco are often coordinated and enacted in a self-organized fashion. Like 
the collective storming of the fences of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, though 
quite different in form, sea crossings do not occur randomly but require strategic 
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coordination. The timing is pivotal for successful sea crossings, as the mass arrivals in Spain 
during football matches of the Moroccan national team in the 2018 World Cup or during the 
end of Ramadan celebrations in June 2018 demonstrated. More than simply being distracted, 
however, the Moroccan military has been involved in the industry of sea migration, with 
military posts along the Moroccan coast being intentionally vacated when groups of migrants 
take to the sea or with members of the military engaging even more actively in the 
arrangements allowing for the departure of boats. {From the editor: This either too much 
or too little . . . I’m not sure it’s necessary, or else, we’d want to understand more 
precisely why they let them pass..} 
In these and other momentary ruptures of the EUropean-North African border 
alliance, migrant subjects localize openings which they seize to escape. Those from the 
migrant community who stay behind on land are part of a safety system that seeks to make 
precarious crossings a little bit safer. They try to stay in contact with the boat via mobile 
phones and forward details such as places and times of departure to rescue authorities, to 
individual activists such as Helena Maleno, {From the editor: I don’t see why her name is 
mentioned since she is not mentioned elsewhere in the essay. I suggest cutting it.} or 
solidarity networks including the Alarm Phone. The majority of boats, often small and made 
of plastic, leave from the coasts of Tangier, larger and better-equipped ones from Nador. In 
the early hours of the day, under the cover of darkness, they depart and attempt to move as far 
north as possible before alerting authorities or solidarity networks. For several years, the most 
commonly used phones were those that could not transmit GPS positions, but this has 
changed, recently shifting to the greater use of smartphones that allow users to share precise 
locations. Once their location is confirmed and ideally in the area where the Spanish SAR 
organization Salvamento Maritimo conducts rescues, the Alarm Phone notifies the Spanish 
authorities in the hope that they would reach the boat before the Moroccan Navy could 
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intercept it—a hope regularly disappointed given the information exchanges between Spanish 
and Moroccan authorities. 
Though crossings are first and foremost the enactment of a freedom of movement by 
migrant subjects, the way they unfold and their intensity also highlight the shifting 
relationship between Morocco, Spain, and the EU.3 Both the rise in arrivals in Spain over the 
summer of 2018 and the subsequent efforts by Moroccan authorities to curtail further 
crossings allow insights into the “borderwork” along this western Mediterranean route 
(Rumford 2015). In July 2018, Frontex issued a warning concerning the increased arrivals in 
Spain (Deutsche Welle 2018), while the newly elected Spanish government implemented a 
range of measures to counter arrivals. Though initially gesturing to a softer stance on 
migration, the Spanish government did not only begin to search for legal means to deport 
sub-Saharan migrants from the Spanish enclaves but also enacted several instances of “hot 
deportations” during which sub-Saharan migrants were rapidly returned to Morocco after 
having jumped the border fences and entering EU territory. With rising numbers of arrivals, 
expectations of Morocco to do more to prevent crossings rose as well. Recent boosts in 
funding via the European Commission (2018), not least to further militarize the Moroccan 
border, need to be understood as incentives for Morocco to respond to EUropean fears about 
the western route. 
Moroccan reactions to the long summer of western Mediterranean migration were 
dramatic. In August and September 2018, Moroccan security forces forcibly removed more 
than two thousand migrants, irrespective of gender, age, or residence status, from the cities of 
Nador and Tangier to the south of Morocco, including three members of the Alarm Phone. As 
one of them wrote, “I can never forget this day, the 11th of September. It was like a 
nightmare. In the six years that I have lived in Morocco, I have never seen practices as cruel 
as these. This violence is not justified—let’s hope it will stop” (Alarm Phone 2018d). 
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Besides repression on land, interceptions of migrant boats increased, as the Alarm 
Phone directly witnessed in mid-September: 
Western Med—A week of Movement, A week of Repression: Last week, we 
supported 17 boats in distress in the Western Mediterranean Sea. Of these 17 boats, 
14 were intercepted by the Moroccan Navy, 2 were rescued to Spain, and 1 boat 
returned to Morocco independently. The many interceptions show that the crack-
down in Morocco on migrant travellers is not confined to the land, where thousands 
have been violently arrested and deported south over the past weeks. Under European 
and Spanish pressure, Moroccan forces are trying to intercept and return as many 
people at sea as possible. (Alarm Phone 2018c) 
As in other (North African) regions, the EU border regime depends on Morocco’s 
collaboration and compliance in the outsourcing of borders, but it is important not to neglect 
Morocco’s own role in the border regime and its logics of othering. Rather than simply 
forming a passive warden of the EU and Spain, Morocco engages in the politics of mobility 
as well (Cherti and Collyer 2015; El Qadim 2018), often using (the threat of) migrant 
crossings to bargain for more favorable agreements, or to buy silence on contentious human 
rights issues. More than that, the existence of a deep-rooted and institutionalized antiblack 
racism, which Laura Menin (2016: 22) describes “as a multi-faceted and historically specific 
phenomenon which is deeply entangled in contemporary socio-political and economic 
circumstances,” needs to be acknowledged as a factor in the often-repressive measures 
targeting the sub-Saharan communities in the Moroccan kingdom. 
Prefigurative Struggles beyond the Sea 
The embeddedness of the Alarm Phone in contested practices of human movement reveals 
important insights into the workings of the EUropean border regime and its interplay with 
“disobedient” mobilities (Heller, Pezzani, and Stierl 2017). Having experienced the 
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breakdown of the EU border regime in 2015 and subsequent attempts to restore its capacity to 
thwart unauthorized crossings, the Alarm Phone’s continuous presence and work renders 
decipherable the regime’s mechanics and transformation over time, repeatedly bringing to 
light what is meant to remain hidden. Listening to the stories and struggles of thousands of 
people on the move and assisting them in a variety of ways has revealed not merely a variety 
of migrant mobilities but also the shifting forces that seek to deter, capture, and contain them. 
Mobilities and attempts to govern them have constituted the Mediterranean as a conflictual 
border zone, where precarious movements are both the result of restrictive migration policies 
and forces of defiance. 
In order to intervene at the “nexus of ‘movement as politics’ and ‘movement as 
motion’” (Mitropoulos and Neilson 2006) and become a segment of a migratory 
“underground railroad,” the Alarm Phone has had to find a constantly evolving transborder 
shape. Being situated in a variety of places on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea was not 
merely a political choice but a necessity. With EUropean borders becoming increasing 
delocalized, outsourced, and externalized, such transversal solidarity was essential to engage 
in the world of subversive mobilities, but also in seeking to be or become prefigurative in 
form, challenging and (re-)connecting the spaces that are broken up by (sovereign and other) 
borders, borders that are meant to demarcate between an inside and outside, an us and them. 
In its desire to continuously remake a global frontier and maintain a segregationist status quo, 
EUrope multiplies its borders throughout society and space. Not least when some of its 
members are deported to the south of Morocco or even to their “countries of origin,” or when 
visa restrictions make it impossible for some to attend larger gatherings, it becomes visible 
within the Alarm Phone network itself how hegemonic borders cut not only through 
geographic spaces and regions, but through the social itself, through fabrics of friendship and 
community. In a small way, though, the Alarm Phone seeks to contest these multiple 
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division-making practices. It aspires to be an infrastructure of sorts, one that sustains 
movement across artificial and often violent borders, and one that amplifies the voices from 
the sea—voices routinely misconceived as simply expressing desperation and victimhood 
while in fact claiming the right to move, and the right to arrive alive. 
Notes 
Both authors are active members of the Alarm Phone. We would like to thank Charles Heller 
and Lorenzo Pezzani, as well as the other reviewers, for their valuable comments on an 
earlier version of this article. Maurice Stierl would also like to thank the Leverhulme Trust 
and Nina Violetta Schwarz the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.  
1. The term EUrope problematizes frequently employed usages that equate the European 
Union (EU) with Europe and Europe with the EU and suggests, at the same time, that EUrope 
is not reducible to the institutions of the EU.  
2. Such a changing relationship is not dependent merely on questions of migration 
“management” but also on other, often conflictual, issues, including economic relations or 
Morocco’s occupation of the western Sahara—a discussion of which, however, would exceed 
the scope of this article. 
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